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I. INTRODUCTION 
Both patent law and antitrust law were created with a similar 
motive—the maximization of consumer surplus.1 Yet, these bodies of 
law come into direct tension because of the means employed by each. 
Whereas antitrust law operates to curtail the evils of anticompetitive 
conduct, intellectual property law attempts to incent innovation by 
restricting competition and harnessing the benefits of monopolistic 
pricing.2 In fact, patent law creates a private right of action, allowing a 
patent owner to bring suit3 against anyone who “without authority 
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention.”4 Although 
patent law allows individuals to capture monopolistic profits, these 
government-endorsed monopolies do not run unchecked.5 Patents are 
limited in duration6 and once the monopoly period has lapsed, the 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2014. 
 1.  See Seungwoo Son, Selective Refusals to Sell Patented Goods: The Relationship 
Between Patent Rights and Antitrust Law, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 109, 110 (discussing 
how antitrust law attempts to “foster[] a competitive marketplace” and intellectual property law 
“promotes innovation by granting a patent or copyright holder the right to limit competition”); 
but see generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF (1978) (arguing that antitrust law should focus on maximizing total surplus as opposed to 
preferencing consumer welfare over producer welfare, an idea associated with the Chicago 
School tradition of antitrust).  
 2.  Son, supra note 1, at 110. 
 3.  See 35 U.S.C.A. § 281 (West 2013) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for 
infringement of his patent.”). 
 4.  35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2013). 
 5.  See Nicholas Economides & William N. Hebert, Patents and Antitrust: Application to 
Adjacent Markets, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 455, 456 (2008) (discussing how patent law 
grants “legal monopolies” that are limited in duration). 
 6.  Id. (“Patent rights for most inventions, including [certain] processes or methods . . . , 
last for twenty years from the date of filing.”). 
GARMEZY POST FINAL READ NEW FORMAT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:23 PM 
198 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 8 
patented innovation enters the public domain.7 Moreover, legal 
doctrines like patent exhaustion restrict the scope of patent 
monopolies.8 
Under the patent exhaustion doctrine, an authorized sale exhausts 
the patent monopoly,9 giving the buyer the right to “use it, repair it, 
modify it, discard it, or resell it, subject only to overriding conditions 
of the sale.”10 In this way, patent exhaustion works to counterbalance 
the patentee’s monopoly power and prevent anticompetitive abuse.11 
The Federal Circuit, however, has developed an opposing doctrine, 
the conditional sale doctrine, under which a patentee may use an 
enforceable contract to restrict the rights of a buyer using a patented 
article, even after a subsequent sale.12 The conditional sale doctrine 
could prove particularly important in the arena of self-replicating 
technologies. Because self-replicating technologies are capable of 
generating multiple, matching copies of the product after an 
authorized sale, such technologies create a wrinkle in patent 
jurisprudence by allowing consumers to circumvent the 
manufacturer’s monopoly.13 Whereas under the exhaustion doctrine 
the seller would be left without a remedy to protect his innovation, 
under the conditional sale doctrine the seller could prevent the buyer 
from replicating his innovation. 
Only by achieving the right balance between antitrust law and 
intellectual property law will we truly maximize long-term consumer 
surplus. The Supreme Court has the opportunity to achieve such a 
 
 7.  See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964) (explaining that in the “post-expiration 
period” the patent enters “the public domain”). 
 8.  Curtis R. Wright, Quanta of Solace?: The Patent Exhaustion Doctrine and Method 
Patents After Quanta Computer, Inc. v. L.G. Electronics, Inc., 30 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 494, 500 
(2009) (“The purpose of the patent exhaustion doctrine is to act as a counterbalance to 
monopoly powers granted to patent owners in order to prevent anticompetitive abuse.”). The 
patent exhaustion doctrine is also known as the first sale doctrine. Yee Wah Chin, Inexhaustible: 
Patents on Self-Replicating Technologies, 3 LANDSLIDE 12, 13 (2011).  
 9.  John W. Osborne, Justice Breyer's Bicycle and the Ignored Elephant of Patent 
Exhaustion: An Avoidable Collision in Quanta v. LGE, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 
245, 249 (2008). 
 10.  Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 11.  Wright, supra note 8, at 500. 
 12.  See Mallinckrodft, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding 
that if a “device is validly licensed for only a single use, any reuse is unlicensed and an 
infringement”). 
 13.  See Jeremy N. Sheff, Self-Replicating Technologies, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 229, 229 
(2013) (commenting that “self-replicating technologies pose a challenge to the legal regimes we 
ordinarily rely on to promote a balance between innovation and competition”). 
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balance in the upcoming case Bowman v. Monsanto Co.,14 where the 
Court may decide whether the patent exhaustion doctrine prevents 
patentees from claiming infringement when a purchaser of self-
replicating seeds uses those seeds to plant subsequent generations.15 
The Supreme Court has yet to endorse the Federal Circuit’s 
conditional sale doctrine and it is unlikely to do so in Bowman. Yet, 
the Court can still hold for Monsanto and exempt self-replicating 
technologies from the patent exhaustion doctrine by treating 
subsequent generations of seeds as impermissible reconstructions that 
infringe the patent. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
At issue in Bowman are two patents owned by Monsanto that 
protect Monsanto’s Roundup Ready® soybean seeds, genetically 
modified to be resistant to glyphosate herbicides like the commonly 
used Roundup® product.16 Monsanto’s 605 patent protects the use of 
the cauliflower mosaic virus as a vector for transforming foreign 
genetic material into plant cells17 and the 247E patent protects the use 
of the cauliflower mosaic virus transformation process to genetically 
modify plants to express glyphosate-tolerant 5–
enolpyruvylshikimate–3–phosphate synthases (EPSPS),18 creating the 
glyphosate resistance prized in Monsanto’s Roundup Ready® 
soybean seeds.19 Since 1996, Monsanto has licensed producers to sell 
Roundup Ready® soybean seeds to individual farmers for planting.20 
Because the glyphosate-resistant seeds are self-replicating, and 
succeeding generations express the patented glyphosate-resistant trait 
(the ESPS technology trait), Monsanto restricts the purchaser’s use to 
a single growing season.21 
 
 
 14.  Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (U.S. argued Feb. 19, 2013). 
 15.  Although Bowman involves self-replicating seeds, the holding may apply to all self-
replicating technologies, including self-replicating nanotechnologies like DNA innovations. 
Supreme Court Case Puts Cutting-Edge Innovation at Stake, INNOVATION AT STAKE (Jan. 17, 
2013), http://www.innovationatstake.com/supreme-court-case-puts-cutting-edge-innovation-at-
stake/. 
 16.  Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 
420 (2012).  
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 1343–44. 
 19.  Id. at 1344. 
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Id. at 1345. 
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All individual purchasers are subject to the Monsanto Technology 
Agreement, under which each individual purchaser agrees: (1) “to use 
the seed containing Monsanto gene technologies for planting a 
commercial crop only in a single season”; (2) “to not supply any of this 
seed to any other person or entity for planting”; (3) “to not save any 
crop produced from this seed for replanting, or supply saved seed to 
anyone for replanting”; and (4) “to not use this seed or provide it to 
anyone for crop breeding, research generation of herbicide 
registration data, or seed production.”22 
Although individuals cannot use second-generation glyphosate-
resistant seeds for replanting, the Monsanto Technology Agreement 
does permit the sale of second-generation seeds to grain elevators for 
use as commodity seed—a mixture of undifferentiated seeds 
harvested from multiple suppliers.23 Under the Monsanto Technology 
Agreement, individuals are not required to place restrictions on the 
grain elevator’s subsequent resale of the seeds.24 If Monsanto had 
blocked the resale of commodity seed, often purchased by animal 
feeding operations,25 Monsanto would have decimated the commodity 
soybean market by reducing the available supply by approximately 
ninety-four percent.26 The unforeseen result of permitting resale, 
however, was that by 2007 ninety-four percent of Indiana’s planted 
soybeans exhibited the patented trait and were therefore immune to 
glyphosate-based herbicide.27 
Defendant-appellant Bowman purchased Roundup Ready® seeds 
from Pioneer Hi–Bred and signed the Pioneer Hi–Bred Technology 
Agreement, which presented identical language to the Monsanto 
 
 22.  Id. at 1344–45 (emphasis added). 
 23.  Id. at 1345. 
 24.  Id. (“Monsanto authorizes growers to sell second-generation seed to local grain 
elevators as a commodity, without requiring growers to place restrictions on grain elevators’ 
subsequent sales of that seed.”). 
 25.  See Dennis Crouch, U.S. Government Brief: Farmer Who Purchases Commodity 
Soybeans Cannot Replant Those Beans Without Committing Patent Infringement, PATENTLYO 
(Jan. 22, 2003), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/01/us-government-brief-farmer-who-
purchases-commodity-soybeans-cannot-replant-those-beans-without-committing-patent-
infringemen.html (discussing the normal use of commodity seed). 
 26.  See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345 (highlighting that ninety-four percent of Indiana’s 
planted soybeans exhibited glyphosate resistance). 
 27.  See id. (noting that “[c]ommodity seeds are a mixture of undifferentiated seeds 
harvested from various sources, including from farms that grow Roundup Ready® soybeans and 
those that do not, although nearly ninety-four percent of Indiana's acres of soybeans planted in 
2007 were planted using herbicide resistant varieties”). 
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Technology Agreement.28 Bowman planted glyphosate-resistant seeds 
for his first crop in Knox County, Indiana each year from 1999 
through 2007,29 and never saved any seeds from his first crop.30 
In 1999, Bowman purchased commodity seed for a second crop.31 
Bowman considered the second crop to be riskier, and consequently 
purchased the cheaper commodity seed instead of Pioneer’s Roundup 
Ready® seed, which is significantly more expensive.32 To determine 
whether his second crop was glyphosate resistant, Bowman applied 
glyphosate-based herbicide to his fields.33 Many of the plants 
exhibited glyphosate resistance, and unlike with his first crop, 
Bowman saved the glyphosate-resistant seeds from his second crop.34 
Bowman used these saved seeds from 2000 to 2007 for his second 
crop, supplemented with additional seeds from the grain elevator.35 A 
Monsanto-driven investigation concluded that the second-crop seeds 
contained the patented EPSPS technology.36 Because the Monsanto 
Technology Agreement only applied to seeds purchased from either 
Monsanto or a Monsanto-licensed dealer, Bowman’s use of the 
commodity seed and its progeny did not strictly fall within the four-
corners of the agreement.37 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
There is widespread debate about the extent to which patent 
holders can enforce downstream, post-sale restrictions upon 
purchasers of the patented product,38 fueled by seemingly divergent 
legal precedent arising from the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit.39 Whereas the Federal Circuit has strengthened post-sale 
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See id. (noting that Bowman purchased “seeds containing the Roundup Ready® 
technology each year, beginning as early as 1999” and that “Bowman planted Roundup Ready® 
seeds as his first-crop in each growing season during the years 1999 through 2007”). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 1345–46. 
 34.  Id. at 1346. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  See id. (remarking that in 2007 “Monsanto investigated eight of Bowman's fields, 
totaling 299.1 acres, and confirmed that Bowman's second-crop soybean seeds . . . contained the 
patented Roundup Ready® technology”). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Erin Julia Daida Austin, Note, Reconciling the Patent Exhaustion and Conditional Sale 
Doctrines in Light of Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2947, 2947–48 
(2009). 
 39.  Id. at 2948. 
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rights to the patent holder via the conditional sale doctrine,40 the 
Supreme Court’s recent holdings have restricted patentee rights.41 
Recently, the debate has centered on whether the patent exhaustion 
doctrine should be applied in the realm of self-replicating 
technologies. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Early Forays into Patent Law 
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution enables 
Congress “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by 
securing for limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive right 
to their respective writings and discoveries.”42 Congress has since 
imposed four requirements for patentability: (1) patentable subject 
matter, (2) usefulness, (3) novelty, and (4) nonobviousness.43 Under 
this rubric, six types of patents have arisen,44 including utility patents, 
which are “[i]ssued for the invention of a new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or a new and useful 
improvement thereof.”45 
The doctrine of patent exhaustion has existed for over 150 years.46 
In 1873, the Court applied the doctrine in Adams v. Burke,47 a case 
concerning a patent on coffin-lids. There, the patentee prevented the 
original purchaser from using the coffin-lids within a certain 
location.48 The Court found that once the coffin-lids had been 
subsequently sold the use restriction had been exhausted.49 The Court 
noted that, “in the essential nature of things, when the patentee . . . 
 
 40.  See id. at 2948–49 (discussing the difference between the patent exhaustion and 
conditional sale doctrines).  
 41.  Kyle M. Costello, The State of the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, Post-Quanta v. LG 
Electronics, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237, 238 n.1 (2010). 
 42.  U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 43.  See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. 
L. REV. 1353, 1361 (discussing the “criteria of novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness”); id. at 
1354 (arguing that the “doctrines on patentable subject matter are difficult to apply”). 
 44.  Types of Patents, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/patdesc.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2013).  
 45.  Id. Method patents fall under the category of utility patents, id., and are patents of “an 
act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a 
different state of things,” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972). 
 46.  Brief for Knowledge Ecology International at 2, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 
(U.S. Dec. 10, 2012). 
 47.  84 U.S. 453 (1873). 
 48.  Id. at 455–56. 
 49.  Id. at 457 (“[W]e hold that in the class of machines or implements we have described, 
when they are once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction on their use to be implied for 
the benefit of the patentee or his assignees or licensees.”). 
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sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives 
the consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that 
use.”50 
Almost seven decades later, in United States v. Univis Lens Co.,51 
the Court again rejected a patent infringement claim under the patent 
exhaustion doctrine.52 There, a patentee sold its patented lens blanks 
to a wholesaler who, in order to market the product, was required to 
first grind the blanks to finish the lenses.53 Univis implicated antitrust 
law as well because the licensed wholesalers were required to sell the 
finished lenses at a price fixed by the patentee.54 The Court, applying 
the patent exhaustion doctrine, held that the patentee could not 
dictate the resale price of the completed lenses.55 It reasoned that 
“where one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it 
embodies essential features of [the] patented invention, is within the 
protection of [the] patent, and has destined the article be finished by 
the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he has sold his invention.”56 
The Court ruled that exhaustion applied whether the patentee sold 
the patented article “in its completed form,” or in an uncompleted 
form “for the purpose of enabling the buyer to finish and sell it.”57 
B. A Brief History of the Patent Act 
In 1952, Congress enacted a comprehensive patent protection 
scheme in Title 35 of the United States Code, otherwise known as the 
Patent Act.58 Section 271(a) of the Act defines infringement broadly: 
“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any 
patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”59 Whereas reconstructing 
a patented item violates § 271(a), because it is considered an 
 
 50.  Id. at 456. 
 51.  316 U.S. 241 (1942). 
 52.  Id. at 250 (“[S]ale of [a patented article] exhausts the monopoly in the article and that 
patentee may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of the 
article.”). 
 53.  Id. at 244. 
 54.  Id. at 245. 
 55.  Id. at 251. 
 56.  Id. at 251–52. 
 57.  Id. at 252. 
 58.  Patent Act, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952). The 1952 Act was by no means Congress’ first 
attempt at creating a federal patent system. See e.g., Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) 
(repealed 1793); Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). The current Act was amended in 
2011, though the subsequent changes are not relevant to this discussion. See Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (imposing a first-to-file-or-first-
to-publicly-disclose system). 
 59.  35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2013). 
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impermissible making, simply repairing an item does not.60 Rather 
problematically, courts have abandoned attempts to create a clear 
framework of rules, instead choosing to rely on a case-by-case 
approach.61 Furthermore, patent infringement can occur beyond 
America’s borders; under § 271(f), “[w]hoever without authority 
supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a 
substantial portion of the components of a patented invention . . . in 
such manner as to actively induce the combination of such 
components” infringes the patent.62 
Section 154(a)(1) of the Patent Act grants patentees “the right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the 
invention.”63 When a patent is infringed, § 281 of the Act provides the 
patentee with a civil remedy64 in federal court.65 The Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit retains exclusive jurisdiction over federal 
patent law appeals from the district courts,66 and has, in recent years, 
developed the conditional sale doctrine in an attempt to strengthen 
patentee protection. 
C. The Federal Circuit and the Conditional Sale Doctrine 
The Federal Circuit’s 1992 decision in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. 
Medipart, Inc.67 marked the beginning of its campaign to provide more 
rights to patent holders by supplementing the traditional patent 
exhaustion doctrine with a newly established conditional sale 
doctrine.68 In Mallinckrodt, the plaintiff held a patent on a medical 
device that delivered therapeutic material to a patient’s lungs in 
aerosol mist form.69 The product was packaged and sold to hospitals 
 
 60.  See Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the 
Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 425–26 (1999) (discussing the 
repair-reconstruction dichotomy). 
 61.  See id. at 426 (discussing the application of the repair-reconstruction dichotomy). 
 62.  35. U.S.C.A. § 271(f)(1) (West 2013) (emphasis added). 
 63.  35. U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(1) (West 2013). 
 64.  35 U.S.C.A. § 281 (West 2013). 
 65.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1338 (West 2013). 
 66.  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(1) (West 2013) (“The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . in any civil action . . . arising under any 
Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .”). 
 67.  976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 68.  See Saami Zain, Quanta Leap or Much Ado About Nothing? An Analysis on the Effect 
of Quanta vs. LG Electronics, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 67, 91 (2010) (“In Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. 
Medipart, Inc., the Federal Circuit directly assailed the first sale doctrine, interpreting 
established Supreme Court cases in a manner as to lessen its effectiveness and thereby permit 
patentees to control downstream use of articles embodying their inventions.”).  
 69.  Mallinckrodt, Inc., 976 F.2d at 701. 
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with a label stating “single use only.”70 Notwithstanding the single-use 
condition, purchasers of the product employed Medipart to 
recondition the used devices, allowing hospitals to use the products 
multiple times.71 The Federal Circuit held that the single-use 
restriction was enforceable, and noted that the condition was 
“reasonably within the patent grant” and related to the “subject 
matter within the scope of the patent claims.”72 In reaching its 
decision, the Federal Circuit relied on Supreme Court precedent 
holding that “private parties retain the freedom to contract 
concerning conditions of sale,” and that such conditions will be valid 
unless they violate “some other law or policy.”73 
Strengthening the conditional sale doctrine further, in Jazz Photo 
Corp. v. International Trade Commission74 the Federal Circuit 
considered the previously unexplored issue of foreign patent 
exhaustion.75 There, the patentee owned patents on lens-fitted film 
packages used in disposable cameras, and sold the film packages 
domestically and internationally.76 After the disposable cameras were 
turned in for development abroad, the defendants refurbished and 
resold them to customers in the United States.77 Applying the 
conditional sale doctrine, the Federal Circuit held that the defendants’ 
actions were “[p]ermissible repair[s],”78 emphasizing that a purchaser 
of a patented article has “the right to use it, repair it, modify it, discard 
it, or resell it, subject only to overriding conditions of sale.”79 The court 
distinguished between “the patentee’s sole right to make or renew the 
entire machine,” and “the right of a purchaser of a patented machine 
to replace the machine’s [parts],” finding that the conduct at issue fell 
into the latter category.80 
 
 
 70.  Id. at 702. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 708. 
 73.  See id. (interpreting the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion doctrine precedent 
narrowly). 
 74.  264 F.3d 1094 (Fed Cir. 2001). 
 75.  Michele L. Vockrodt, Patent Exhaustion and Foreign First Sales: An Analysis and 
Application of the Jazz Photo Decision, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 189, 190 (2005). 
 76.  Jazz Photo, 264 F.3d at 1098. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 1110–11. 
 79.  Id. at 1102 (emphasis added). 
 80.  Id. at 1103; see id. at 1102 (noting that “the rights of ownership do not include the right 
to construct an essentially new article on the template of the original, for the right to make the 
article remains with the patentee”). 
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D. The Supreme Court’s Inclination to Weaken Patent Protection 
Despite the broad language in the Patent Act, and in direct 
contrast to the Federal Circuit’s emphasis on patentee protection, the 
Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted patentee rights, primarily 
through maintaining a robust patent exhaustion doctrine. In Microsoft 
Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,81 AT&T owned a patent for a speech-processing 
method expressed in software code,82 comparable “to a blueprint.”83 
AT&T claimed that Microsoft had infringed its patent when 
Microsoft’s Windows software, which incorporated the speech 
processing function, was copied onto other foreign hard drives.84 The 
Court found that the act of selling the software code did not meet 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f)’s requirement that a patented invention’s components 
be sold for combination abroad,85 “[b]ecause no physical object 
originating in the United States was combined with [the foreign] 
computers.”86 Although the Federal Circuit had previously only 
applied § 271(f) to exclusively international conduct,87 the Court 
clarified that § 271(f)(1) does not provide an exception to the general 
presumption that “no infringement occurs when a patented product is 
made and sold in another country.”88 The Court noted in dictum that a 
“machine for making sprockets might be used by a manufacturer to 
produce tens of thousands of sprockets an hour,” but this would not 
“make the machine a ‘component’ of the tens of thousands of devises 
in which the sprockets are incorporated.”89 
In 2008, the Court in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, 
Inc.90 reaffirmed that “[t]he longstanding doctrine of patent 
exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item 
terminates all patent rights to that item.”91 There, LG Electronics held 
patents for computer processing methods licensed to Intel.92 Intel 
incorporated LG’s processing methods into microprocessors and 
 
 81.  550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
 82.  Id. at 449. 
 83.  Id. at 550. 
 84.  Id. at 442. 
 85.  Id. at 449. 
 86.  Id. at 462. 
 87.  Viki Economides, Note, Tianrui Group Co. v. International Trade Commission: The 
Dubious Status of Extraterritoriality and the Domestic Industry Requirement of Section 337, 61 
AM. U. L. REV. 1235, 1246–47 (2012). 
 88.  Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 441. 
 89.  Id. at 451. 
 90.  553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
 91.  Id. at 625. 
 92.  Id. at 621–24.  
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chipsets, which it subsequently sold to computer manufacturers.93 One 
of the licensing terms stipulated that Intel’s customers could not 
combine Intel products containing LG’s patented methods with non-
Intel components.94 The Court rejected LG’s argument that patent 
exhaustion should not apply to method patents, and found that there 
had been no infringement,95 because “methods nonetheless may be 
‘embodied’ in a product, the sale of which exhausts patent rights.”96 
Quanta chipped away at the Federal Circuit’s conditional sale 
doctrine by reaffirming that patents are susceptible to the patent 
exhaustion doctrine.97 The Court took a pragmatic approach to 
intellectual property protection, wary that otherwise “[p]atentees 
seeking to avoid patent exhaustion could simply draft their patent 
claims to describe a method rather than an apparatus.”98 In the 
interest of maintaining a robust patent exhaustion doctrine, the Court 
was unwilling to exempt method patents. 
E. Precedent Governing Self-Replicating Biotechnologies 
The issue of self-replicating patented seeds that arises in Bowman 
is not one that has been thoroughly fleshed out by either the Supreme 
Court or the Federal Circuit. Though the Supreme Court has 
considered the issue of patented plant seeds, it has not yet issued a 
decision addressing the problems posed by self-replicating patented 
plant seeds under the patent exhaustion doctrine. In J.E.M. Ag Supply, 
Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.,99 a case concerning hybrid 
corn seeds, the Court held that genetically modified plant breeds are 
patentable subject matter.100 Thus, a purchaser could not “use a 
protected plant variety to produce a hybrid for commercial sale,” 
because this conduct would infringe the patent.101 It was unnecessary 
for the Court to address the issue of patent exhaustion to dispose of 
the case.102 
 
 
 93.  Id. at 623–24. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 630. 
 96.  Id. at 628. 
 97.  Id. (“Eliminating exhaustion for method patents would seriously undermine the 
exhaustion doctrine.”).  
 98.  Id. 
 99.  534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
 100.  See id. at 130–31 (holding that “living things [are] patentable”). 
 101.  Id. at 143. 
 102.  In fact, nowhere did the Court mention the issue of patent exhaustion. 
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The Federal Circuit has also dealt with cases involving the 
replication of patented seeds, most notably in Monsanto Co. v. 
Scruggs103 and Monsanto Co. v. McFarling.104 In both cases, the court 
issued favorable rulings to Monsanto, the patentee.105 In McFarling, 
the defendant saved bushels of Monsanto’s patented glyphosate-
resistant soybean seeds and used them for replanting in subsequent 
years.106 The court made three findings: first, that the patent 
exhaustion doctrine was not applicable to future generation seeds 
where a previous generation had not been sold; second, that the 
purchase price of the seeds reflected only the value of the use rights; 
and third and most importantly, that the “original sale of the seeds did 
not confer a license to construct new seeds.”107 Similarly, in Scruggs, 
the defendant purchased Monsanto’s patented glysophate-resistant 
cotton seeds, but without first signing the licensing agreement, and 
then saved seeds to grow in subsequent years.108 The court observed 
that “[t]he fact that a patented technology can replicate itself does not 
give a purchaser the right to use replicated copies of the 
technology.”109 Applying the patent exhaustion doctrine “to 
subsequent generations of self-replicating technology would 
eviscerate the rights of the patent holder.”110 
IV. RULING BELOW 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Indiana found Bowman liable to Monsanto, and held “that patent 
exhaustion [did] not apply to Bowman’s accused second-crop 
plantings.”111 The Federal Circuit upheld the ruling in favor of 
Monsanto on appeal.112 Judge Richard Linn, writing for the court, 
turned to McFarling and Scruggs, two previous Federal Circuit cases 
 
 103.  459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 104.  302 F.3d 1291 (Fed Cir. 2002). 
 105.  In McFarling, the court declared that “Monsanto had a reasonable likelihood of 
success on the issues of infringement and breach of contract, and that it was unlikely that an 
antitrust violation would be found.” 302 F.3d at 1299. In Scruggs, the Federal Circuit held that 
infringement had occurred and that “Scruggs had no implied license to use Monsanto’s patented 
biotechnology.” 459 F.3d at 1336. 
 106.  McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1293. 
 107.  Id. at 1299. 
 108.  Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333. 
 109.  Id. at 1336. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 
420 (2012). 
 112.  Id. 
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that grappled with the planting of second-generation, glyphosate-
resistant seeds, and noted that in both cases “the doctrine of patent 
exhaustion did not bar the infringement claims.”113 
Judge Linn, citing Jazz Photo Corporation v. International Trade 
Commission, applied the principle that the right to plant the 
glyphosate-resistant seeds “d[id] not include the right to construct an 
essentially new article on the template of the original, for the right to 
make the article remain[ed] with the patentee.”114 By spraying his 
second crop to create glyphosate-resistant seeds, Bowman constructed 
newly-infringing articles. The court rejected Bowman’s argument that 
an individual seed “substantially embodies” all future generation 
seeds, and that the sale of second-generation seed to grain elevators 
thus exhausted the patent.115 Rather, the court found, pursuant to 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., “nothing in the record 
indicates that the ‘only reasonable and intended use’ of commodity 
seeds is for replanting them to create new seeds.”116 Moreover, the 
court pointed out that “[a]pplying the first sale doctrine to subsequent 
generations of self-replicating technology would eviscerate the rights 
of the patent holder.”117 The court was concerned with the practical 
consequences of inadequate patent protection for self-replicating 
technologies and construed patent exhaustion precedent narrowly. 
V. ARGUMENTS 
Bowman argues for the application of a strict exhaustion doctrine 
while Monsanto urges the Court to consider the economic 
consequences of applying such a doctrine to self-replicating 
technologies. Additionally, Monsanto contends that the exhaustion 
doctrine should not apply because Bowman’s infringement occurred 
in subsequent generations to the initial seeds sold.118 
 
 
 113.  Id. at 1347. 
 114.  Id. at 1348 (quoting Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 
(Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Id. (quoting Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 631 (2008)). 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Both parties also make statutory interpretation arguments regarding the meaning of 
the word “make[]” in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), which are not discussed here. The Supreme Court is 
unlikely to hold on statutory interpretation grounds alone in light of the pragmatic approach it 
has been taking to deciding issues arising under patent law, such as in Quanta. 
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A. Arguments for Petitioner, Bowman 
Bowman’s arguments rely heavily on older Supreme Court cases 
creating a strong patent exhaustion doctrine, and also on its recent 
decision in Quanta.119 Bowman argues that selling the seeds to the 
grain elevator was an authorized sale that extinguished the patent 
holder’s rights120 and that Monsanto did not include language in the 
Monsanto Technology Agreement that created a reversionary 
interest.121 Once the farmer grows progeny seeds, the farmer is 
authorized to sell the seeds to grain elevators,122 and the selling 
farmers are not required to place any restrictions on these sales.123 The 
Monsanto Technology Agreement also permits grain elevators to sell 
the patented, progeny seeds as an undifferentiated commodity.124 
Bowman argues that, analogous to Adams v. Burke, where the 
purchaser also intended to use a patented product in a way that the 
patentee claimed to be unauthorized,125 the authorized sale to the 
grain elevator afforded a subsequent purchaser full use rights.126 
Bowman claims that patent “exhaustion has only one 
requirement—an authorized sale,” and that this principle remains true 
“even if the sale is to a person who intends to use the patented article 
in a manner that is not authorized by the patentee.”127 Because seeds 
are self-replicating, successive generations of seeds are embodied in 
earlier generations and are therefore protected by the patent. 
Pursuant to Quanta, the “sale of a self-replicating product embodying 
an invention exhausts patent rights to subsequent generations that are 
 
 119.  See Brief for Petitioner at 11, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (U.S. Dec. 3, 
2012) (maintaining that United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) and Adams v. 
Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873) support Petitioner’s arguments); Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. at 250 
(“[S]ale of [a patented article] exhausts the monopoly in the article and that patentee may not 
thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of the article.”); Adams, 84 U.S. 
at 456 (“[I]n the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the persons having his rights, 
sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its 
use and he parts with the right to restrict that use.”). 
 120.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 119, at 14 (“By authorizing the sale of patented 
seeds, Monsanto has authorized the sale of a product that can be used for practicing the patents 
and therefore has parted with all ability to restrict such use under the patent laws.”).  
 121.  Id. at 30. 
 122.  Id. at 31. 
 123.  Id. at 32. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456–57 (1873) (finding that where a contract 
prevented the patent assignee from using the patented coffin-lids within a specific radius, a 
subsequent sale exhausted this condition). 
 126.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 119, at 33. 
 127.  Id. at 13. 
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embodied in the product sold.”128 Monsanto could have restricted the 
ability to sell the second-generation seeds for use as a commodity by 
simply modifying the Monstanto Technology Agreement.129 
Bowman highlights the schism in jurisprudence between the 
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, contending that the Federal 
Circuit improperly held in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. that 
patent exhaustion does not apply to “an expressly conditional sale.”130 
Bowman argues that Mallinckrodt failed to appreciate that the 
Supreme Court has applied patent exhaustion to any and all 
authorized sales.131 
Bowman rejects the contention that even if exhaustion did not 
apply,132 he would still be liable under the reasoning that, as “the next 
generation of seed develops, the grower has created a newly 
infringing article.”133 Bowman argues that the planting of the second-
generation seeds was not a “reconstruction” because a reconstruction 
necessitates that patented articles become worn out or broken, and 
Bowman used the seeds without repairing them.134 
Finally, Bowman rejects the Federal Circuit’s claim that 
“[a]pplying the [patent exhaustion] doctrine to subsequent 
generations of self-replicating technology would eviscerate the rights 
of the patent holder,” because patentees can enforce use restrictions 
through contracts.135 Bowman contends that the lower court’s ruling 
effectively created an exception to the patent exhaustion doctrine. If 
Congress thought it appropriate to create an exception for self-
replicating technologies, as it has in other fields, it could legislate on 
the matter.136 
 
 
 128.  Id. at 14. 
 129.  Id. at 16. 
 130.  Id. at 22–23. 
 131.  Id. at 24. 
 132.  Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. 
Ct. 420 (2012). 
 133.  Id. at 1348. 
 134.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 119, at 14. 
 135.  Monsanto, 657 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 549 F.3d 1328, 1336 
(Fed. Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 136.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 119, at 52 (noting that Congress passed the Visual 
Artists Rights Act, allowing artists to retain attribution rights and prohibit destruction of their 
artworks regardless of ownership of economic rights). 
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B. Arguments for Respondent, Monsanto 
Monsanto makes two primary arguments. First, Monsanto claims 
that a conditional sale doctrine is necessary, highlighting the 
pragmatic implications of coupling a strict patent exhaustion doctrine 
with the economic realities underlying self-replicating technologies,137 
particularly the deleterious impact on incentives to innovate.138 
Second, Monsanto argues that Bowman violated § 271(a) of the 
Patent Act by creating newly infringing articles.139 
Monsanto maintains that the “[patent exhaustion] doctrine does 
not apply to the new soybeans [that Bowman] made,” because they 
were neither subjected to sale nor authorized for sale by Monsanto.140 
Patent exhaustion permits the purchaser to use and resell the 
particular article purchased, but the doctrine does not grant the 
purchaser the right to make new copies of the invention.141 Monsanto 
emphasizes that in past Supreme Court patent exhaustion cases—
including Quanta, United States v. Univis Lens Co., and Adams—the 
Court “has never wavered from the principle that patent exhaustion 
applies only to the specific article that was sold in an authorized 
sale.”142 Because the second-generation seeds were not originally sold 
to Bowman, the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to those seeds.143 
Accordingly, each soybean produced with the Roundup Ready® trait 
was a unique infringing article embodying the protected invention.144 
 
 
 137.  See Brief for Respondents at 45, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (U.S. Jan. 16, 
2013) (arguing that if a farmer is permitted to produce more seeds containing the patented trait, 
the “result would be both undesirable and impracticable,” and “in all likelihood, Monsanto 
would be unable to bring its invention to market”). 
 138.  Id. at 15. 
 139.  See id. at 14–15 (“[Bowman’s] contention fundamentally misapprehends the doctrine, 
which applies only to the specific article sold, not to new articles embodying the patented 
invention.”).  
 140.  Id. at 10. 
 141.  See id. at 15 (“Patent exhaustion, where it properly applies, allows the purchaser of an 
article embodying an invention to use and resell that particular article—but it does not confer 
the right to make, use, or sell the invention generally.”). See also 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(1) (West 
2013) (defining the contents of a patent and the rights of the patentee, and nowhere conferring 
on the purchaser the right to make new copies of a patented invention). 
 142.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 137, at 15–16.  
 143.  Id. at 3738; see also Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 663 (1895) 
(holding that the owner’s rights to a patented machine are exhausted when a patent owner “has 
himself constructed a machine, and sold it without any conditions”); Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 
544, 548 (1872) (holding that patent exhaustion is triggered “where the sale is absolute, and 
without any conditions”).  
 144.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 137, at 18. 
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Moreover, patentees may furnish certain use rights and not others 
when commercializing their product.145 The reproduction of the 
Roundup Ready® trait violated the terms of the Monsanto 
Technology Agreement, which only provided Bowman with the 
license to use the patented technology for one growing season.146 The 
price paid by Bowman would be trivial if Bowman could use the 
Roundup Ready® technology into perpetuity.147 If any farmer could 
reproduce the technology at will, Monsanto would have to charge an 
astronomical sum to first-generation users in order to recover 
research and development costs.148 
Monsanto contends that holding for Bowman “would be 
particularly devastating to innovation in biotechnology.”149 Inventors 
would lack incentive to undertake long-term, expensive research 
endeavors, because their inventions would not receive sufficient 
protection against replication.150 Contractual remedies are insufficient 
to provide the proper incentives because it would be impossible, as a 
matter of practice, to establish contractual privity with everyone who 
might misappropriate the protected technology.151 
VI. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court should hold for Monsanto and recognize 
Monsanto’s patent rights in subsequent generations of the self-
replicating seeds. This will both incentivize investment in 
biotechnology by assuring patentees that their innovation will be 
adequately protected, and improve efficiency by making it profitable 
for patentees to sell their seeds at lower prices. The Court can do so 
without eroding the patent exhaustion doctrine by characterizing 
Bowman’s opportunistic actions, in spraying his second crop to create 
seeds exhibiting glyphosate-resistance, as an impermissible making 
under the Patent Act. Moreover, the Court can distinguish this case 
from Quanta because the restrictions at issue here are procompetitive.  
 
 145.  Id. at 37–38. 
 146.  Id. at 34. 
 147.  Id. at 35. 
 148.  See id. at 44–45 (highlighting that farmers have the ability to “create millions of copies 
within a few years,” and thus “Monsanto would quickly lose the ability to commercialize its 
invention . . . [and] would be unable to bring its invention to market”). 
 149.  Id. at 31. 
 150.  Id. at 31–32. 
 151.  See id. at 51 (claiming that it would be an “impossible task” to contract with all parties 
that could potentially infringe on the patent holder’s rights). 
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A. Incentivizing Innovation and Increasing Efficiency 
Providing the proper incentives for private investment in 
biotechnology is especially important because of rapid global 
population growth152 and increased desertification.153 The coupling of 
increased food demand and decreased arable land is creating a need 
for high-yielding agriculture. In 2010, private firms invested $3.5 
billion for research and development in the seed industry alone.154 
Seed innovation is beneficial to farmers as well; they experienced a 
$3.3 billion increase in soybean-related income in 2010.155 Adequately 
protecting patentee rights in seed technology will help ensure that 
companies continue to invest in new agricultural innovation and that 
farmers have a healthy supply of affordable, high-yielding seed. 
Patent protection in the arena of self-replicating seeds is 
particularly important. Whereas developing beneficial seed traits is 
extremely costly, the patented traits are easily reproduced once 
developed because the seed’s progeny contains the desired traits and 
can thus be proliferated rapidly. Consequently, if the exhaustion 
doctrine applied to self-replicating technologies, a patentee would be 
economically compelled to charge an individual farmer the full value 
of the invention upfront in order to recoup research, development, 
and production costs.156 This financial burden would be nearly 
impossible for any individual farmer to bear, and would decimate the 
demand for these seeds. 
In addition, faithfully applying the exhaustion doctrine would 
exacerbate the very anticompetitive effects that the exhaustion 
doctrine attempts to circumvent.157 Under Monsanto’s current 
 
 152.  See Kenneth R. Weiss, Fertility Rates Fall, but Global Population Explosion Goes on, 
L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/population/la-fg-
population-matters1-20120722-html,0,7213271.htmlstory (discussing global, exponential 
population growth). 
 153. See generally Hari Eswaren et al., Global Desertification Tension Zones, NATURAL 
RES. CONSERVATION SERV. (1998), http://soils.usda.gov/use/worldsoils/papers/tensionzone-
paper.html (last accessed Feb. 8, 3013) (examining population growth, desertification, and 
current agricultural strain); Ha-Lin Zhao et al., Effects of Desertification on Soil and Crop 
Growth Properties in Horgin Sandy Cropland of Inner Mongolia, North China, 87 SOIL & 
TILLAGE RESEARCH 175 (2006), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167198705001182 (same). 
 154.  Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Seed Trade Association in Support of 
Respondents at 17, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2013). 
 155.  Brief of Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Bowman v. 
Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2013). 
 156.  Id. at 5. 
 157.  See id. (“Such high upfront costs would be problematic for farmers with highly variable 
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business model, farmers purchase new seeds every year because they 
are prohibited from reusing second-generation seeds. This provides 
flexibility, because no individual farmer needs to make a long-term 
investment in any single seed variety; rather, farmers have the 
freedom to easily change suppliers, increasing avenues for desirable 
competition.158 Monsanto’s current business model improves 
efficiency by allowing the second-generation seeds to be used as 
commodity seed instead of forcing the seed to go to waste. 
B. Construing Bowman’s Actions as an Impermissible Making 
Under a faithful construction, the patent exhaustion doctrine 
applies exclusively to the seeds purchased directly from Monsanto. 
The seeds Bowman used for his second crop were not the same seeds 
that were purchased via an authorized sale.159 Additionally, Bowman’s 
purposeful spraying of his crop to retain only the herbicide-resistant 
seeds was opportunistic, as it was intended to create a fully-resistant 
progeny to be used in subsequent years. The Supreme Court can hold 
in favor of Monsanto without eroding the patent exhaustion doctrine 
by ruling that Bowman’s actions were an impermissible making under 
35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Under the rule articulated in Jazz Photo, 
Monsanto can furnish Bowman with the right to use the protected 
seeds without conferring the right to “construct” further seeds; when 
Bowman sprayed his commodity crop with herbicides with the intent 
of creating glysophate-resistant seeds, he impermissibly constructed 
the patented article.160 
C. Distinguishing Quanta 
Bowman’s reliance on Quanta is misguided. The post-sale 
restriction LG Electronics was attempting to use in Quanta restricted 
 
income, requiring long-term borrowing at higher interest rates.”). 
 158.  Id. (noting that high upfront costs would lock farmers into particular seed choices, 
stifling competition among seed manufacturers “that occurs as farmers seek out the best new 
seed varieties from season to season”). See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1950) 
(discussing why competition is desirable and claiming that “[t]he heart of our national economic 
policy long has been faith in the value of competition”). 
 159.  See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 
S. Ct. 420 (2012). 
 160.  See Jazz Photo Corp. v. International Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (discussing the difference between a permissible repair and a prohibited reconstruction); 
Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 548 (1872) (finding that one who purchases a machine “for the 
purpose of using it in the ordinary pursuits of life . . . does not acquire any right to construct 
another machine . . . for his own use”). 
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competition and was therefore anticompetitive,161 whereas Monsanto’s 
restriction increases the ability for competition in the seed 
marketplace and is therefore procompetitive. Moreover, the Quanta 
Court explicitly cabined the holding to apply only to “the sale of 
components of a patented system that must be combined with 
additional components in order to practice the patented methods.”162 
The seeds Bowman used for his second crop did not require 
additional components and were not protected by a method patent, 
rendering Quanta’s holding inapplicable to the facts in Bowman. 
Accordingly, due to the nature of the biotechnology industry as 
requiring strong patent protection, the ability to characterize 
Bowman’s actions as an impermissible reconstruction, and the factual 
differences between Quanta and the case at hand, the Court should 
hold for Monsanto. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court likely granted certiorari in this case to 
address the Federal Circuit’s deviant strain of precedent, and will use 
the case as a canvas on which to diminish the conditional sale 
doctrine. By holding that the creation of second-generation seeds was 
an impermissible making, the Court will not need to apply the patent 
exhaustion doctrine. This will allow the Court to maintain a strong 
exhaustion doctrine while still upholding a decision protecting 
patentee rights. The Court’s decision in this case will likely have a 
significant impact on innovation incentives throughout the entire 
biotechnology sector. If the Court holds for Bowman, scientists 
attempting to sell specific gene sequences may not be able to 
financially recoup their research and development costs; if the genes 
they design can simply be replicated and resold, a patentee’s rights to 
receive lasting supracompetitive profits will be destroyed. In order to 
protect and bolster this important sector in the national economy, the 
Court should exempt self-replicating technologies from the 
exhaustion doctrine by construing subsequent generations as 
reconstructions. 
 
 
 161.  See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 630 (2008) (employing a 
practical approach to the patent exhaustion doctrine as applied to method patents). LG 
Electronics’ restriction in Quanta prevented the purchaser from combining the patented 
product with another non-Intel product. Id. at 624.  
 162.  Id. at 621. 
